The issue of public debt has been and continues to be the cornerstone of the Greek saga. The inability to service it led the country to the first memorandum, and the need to normalize the servicing costs led lenders to undertake one of the largest debt restructurings in recent history. The process of revising the terms of servicing and restructuring public debt is ongoing.

Regardless of their differences, all estimates converge on their central scenario regarding an indefinite perpetuation of the problem, especially in the event of adverse economic developments leading to an “explosive” increase in debt. If we also consider the reversal of the quantitative easing policies of central banks, the announced cancellation of the member states’ bond purchase programs by the European Central Bank, the evolving re-pricing of risk in bond markets, and the medium- and long-term forecasts of sluggish economic growth for most developed economies, then the issue of public debt remains a cornerstone for future developments and urgently requires a thorough assessment of the policies applied – not just for historical reasons.

Proposals for Greek debt are being published and evaluated in light of the completion of the third program and the return to the “markets.” It is noted that after a period of more than eight years of crisis, during which several interventions in debt management were made, there is no mechanism for the nominal reduction of the debt of Eurozone member countries.

In this context, it has been necessary to label Greek debt as sustainable in order to circumvent the articles governing the functioning of the ESM and the IMF. The result of these shortcomings is the inability to provide decisive solutions for Greek debt, as the measures taken corresponded more to those addressing liquidity crises rather than debt crises.

The current structure of Greek debt renders it vulnerable to speculative attacks and, consequently, turns it into a destabilizing factor. Moreover, the prolonged maintenance of high debt in a currency not controlled by the domestic Central Bank contains an intrinsic element of destabilization, which exacerbates crises and feeds speculative attacks.

As can be inferred from the assessment of interventions in the net present value of the debt, the limits of financial engineering have been exhausted. If a cut in the nominal value of Greek debt is not made, given its trajectory, the solution to the debt issue will be pushed into the twenty-second century.