In the spring of 1953, Greek Prime Minister Alexandros Papagos “offered” the President of the United States military bases “anywhere on Greek territory.” Four years later, the American chargé d'affaires in Athens concluded that the Greek leadership was distancing itself from the “essentially ‘American’ policy” of previous years.

Shortly thereafter, Konstantinos Karamanlis himself reproached the American embassy for the sudden fall of his government. However, in the summer of 1961, in the eyes of the Americans, Greece looked once again “like a good revolver,” ready to “take aim” in the East-West showdown.

At a time when tensions abruptly followed international recession, Greece, as would happen in the future, struggled to keep pace with its allies. The storm of the Cyprus issue and the desperate effort to emerge from economic stagnation prompted many Greeks to seek solutions beyond the one-sided attachment to the United States.

Washington, for its part, was excessively absorbed in conducting the Cold War to timely respond to the need for a more balanced relationship with Athens. While not ignoring the broader international context, this study brings to light new evidence that captures the dynamic evolution of, by necessity, an asymmetrical relationship.

[Excerpt from the text on the back cover of the edition]