The implementation of decisions is one of the pillars of the Rule of Law and is inextricably linked to the quality of justice administration. From this starting point, and bearing in mind that selective enforcement leads to selective justice, this text focuses on the enforcement of decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).

The purpose is to examine the complex issue of the binding power that decisions hold in member states. Is this power really binding, or does it sometimes remain a "noble wish"? The study aims to investigate the interrelated dimensions of this issue.

To achieve this, it is divided into five parts. The first part focuses on the appropriate presentation of the existing mechanism for enforcing ECHR decisions and considers the role of the political bodies involved in the process. The second part examines the evolution of the enforcement mechanism in light of ECHR case law.

The third part deals with the underlying causes associated with the problem of deficient or non-implementation, including those arising in inter-state cases. The fourth part emphasizes the impact of ECHR decisions on the Greek legal order, as well as the reasoning of how the supranational legislative text has influenced domestic practice and legislation, providing specific examples.

Considering that slow or non-implementation is a sensitive point in the Convention system, the study ultimately examines possible means of improvement that could enhance the effectiveness of the enforcement system.