Indirect consequences of assisted reproduction, and especially in-vitro fertilization, are that through this, many - technically feasible - family structures are multiplied. For example, single men can have a child with donor eggs and a surrogate mother, widowers and widows can have a child using the cryopreserved genetic material of their deceased partner, elderly individuals can also have children with donor genetic material or a surrogate mother, and same-sex couples can now also aim for parenthood.

These possibilities, of course, cause some discomfort in society, meaning not all are socially accepted, and the same applies to the law, which hesitates to accept and regulate some of them. For example, it still prohibits access to assisted reproduction for same-sex couples.

Moreover, the individual methods of artificial reproduction raise other issues, such as the possibility of utilizing artificial insemination by individuals who lack freedom, because they are in prison, or the possibility for a surrogate mother to have an abortion after agreeing with others to give birth on their behalf.

Should society and the law accept these possibilities? And should legal experts reconsider and revise concepts such as consanguinity or marriage prohibitions? The submissions published in this issue aim to answer these and other related questions.