In Greek-Turkish relations, the policy of appeasement has been the historical conscious choice of Greece in response to Turkish revisionism, which escalated and took on a modern context and form following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974.

This policy has faced serious criticism in recent years, while the strategy of deterrence is being promoted as a potential doctrine for its replacement. Given the rapid developments in the Eastern Mediterranean region, the historical examination of the policy of appeasement highlights the ineffectiveness of the doctrine, its weaknesses, and its failures.

The book examines the most significant historical cases, specifically the crises of 1976, 1987, and Imia, as well as the three Greek-Turkish agreements that followed - the Bern Document (1976), the Davos Communiqué (1988), and the Madrid Communiqué (1997).

The shocking revelations of the book are based on personal interviews with diplomats, military personnel, and politicians who participated in the events, relevant U.S. archives (after declassification or leaks), the minutes of the Turkish Parliament, and Turkish-language literature.