The geopolitical necessity of the Cold War brought the U.S. to the Eastern Mediterranean. Although the U.S. needed both Greece and Turkey to achieve their goals, the two steadfast allies came to the brink of war six times. The U.S. had to find a way each time to contain the two pillars of NATO's southeastern flank to avoid a disastrous conflict that would lead to a rupture of the Alliance and loss of control over the pivotal area of the Eastern Mediterranean.

At the same time, however, they did not want to jeopardize their relations with either side, which became known as the policy of even-handedness. The guardian's dilemma is a theoretical model that encapsulates the web of unwanted choices that unfold before a great power when facing problems among its allies: whichever stance it takes in the event of a crisis, the side that feels aggrieved by its behavior feels abandoned, and the side that feels satisfied is encouraged to further pursue its goals.

The purpose of the book is to illuminate the deadlocks that arise in triangular alliance relationships, examining the role of America in six Greek-Turkish crises during the Cold War, drawing valuable lessons for today and tomorrow.

The book examines the dilemma faced by the U.S. in its relationships with Greece and Turkey, focusing on six crises during the Cold War: from the first crisis of 1955 and the three Cyprus crises in 1963-1964, 1967, and 1974, to the two Aegean crises in 1976 and 1987. A common denominator of all was the U.S. attempt to maintain even-handedness, which was expressed through the policy of dual containment aimed at maintaining control over the geopolitically critical area of the Eastern Mediterranean.