The EDA sought a "miracle" regarding Cyprus: the achievement of a solution away from the framework of Western allies, at a time when such a possibility had never been seriously considered either by the Greek governments or by Makarios, and there was no chance it would be examined.

However, while waiting for the "miracle" due to the Cyprus issue and its derivatives (anti-Americanism, pro-Soviet sentiment, neutrality), the EDA emerged from the political isolation of the early decade, firmly challenged the stigma of being the "unpatriotic" party, and achieved the unthinkable: a few years after the defeat of the Left at Grammos, it was elected as the official opposition (1958). In other words, it achieved the "miracle" while waiting for the "miracle".

This is not a triumphant story about how the EDA supported the Cypriot struggle. Such a narrative would be superficial, hasty, and shallow. On the contrary, it is a story about how the EDA, at the leadership level, did not support the Cypriot struggle (despite numerous contraindications). It is a story that does not read the laudatory speeches of the EDA in favor of Cyprus, but rather what is left unsaid. It is a revealing story...