Based on a plethora of primary sources, this study traces the course of a current of pragmatism that runs through the management of the Cyprus issue from the eve of its revival at the UN until the illegal Turkish invasion.

Following a timeless pattern in modern Greek history, this current embraced the spirit of "reflective adjustments," an active moderate approach to Greek foreign policy with visionary motives. In contrast to the radical presentism of the supporters of immediate Union – part of the "eternal Diligianism" that George Theotokas criticized in 1955 – the proponents of reflective adjustments started from the observation that the dire post-war circumstances dictated that Athens initially focus on achieving Cyprus's independence.

These voices warned in due time that the trend to downplay the British factor and the escalating Turkish revisionism would have an immediate impact on the vital interests of Greece and Cyprus; that the September events of 1955 were proof that Ankara did not address the Cyprus issue in isolation but as part of a unified gamble with interconnected claims in the Eastern Aegean; that overlooking this fundamental principle in Turkish foreign policy would have adverse effects for the Greeks of Constantinople, the Greek communities of Imvros and Tenedos, and the Ecumenical Patriarchate.

Having been sidelined at critical moments in the evolution of the Cyprus issue, the "reflective" voices are now being brought back from the margins of history and highlighted, among other things, as a last line of defense of diplomacy against the Cyprus policy of the dictatorship.

Through the pages of this book, other significant aspects of the Cyprus issue are examined: accusations of maintaining a "dual line" from Athens and the disagreement surrounding the radicalization of the union struggle; the multiple uses of the narrative regarding the "dehellenization" of the Cypriots; the cases of A. S. Vlahos, George Seferis, and Alexis Kyrou; the political influence exerted by the atmosphere of the "face line"; the post-civil war pressures against the formation of an authentically pan-Cypriot anti-colonial front, out of fear that the Cypriot left might be strengthened; finally, the anxiety of pragmatists to safeguard the institutional integrity of foreign policy and their thoughts on a comprehensive "cleansing" of Greek-Turkish relations.