In this study, the author attempts a justice-sociological analysis of the concept, structure, and function of legal acts within the legal system of modern society. Specifically, it seeks to answer the question of what it may mean today to interpret, understand, and explain, from a sociological perspective, legal acts.

At the same time, the author provides an extensive overview — both in a diachronic and synchronic context — of the scientific debate concerning the possibilities and limits of modern sociological thought regarding law and legal science, offering insightful perspectives into this area.

It starts from the assumption that the sociology of law must take into account the way in which law itself defines what is legally relevant. On the one hand, legal acts, like all acts in general, cannot be treated independently of the processes in which they are produced and attributed to actors.

On the other hand, from a sociological perspective, legal acts are always involved in the relationship between social differentiation and the internal differentiation of law. The distinction between social structure and semantics expresses abstractly the distinction between legally significant concepts and reality.

It should be noted that, as legally significant concepts, one should not only consider those traditionally regarded as legal. Justice-ethical or justice-philosophical theories also have legal interest, to the extent that they are accepted by practicing legal professionals and legitimize existing legal orders, or facilitate the identification and application of sources of law or contribute to the systematization and coherence of "legal material".