The book Perception and Idealism addresses two timeless philosophical problems: how perception makes objects visible to us and what the character of the world must be for objects to be visible in this way.

In Part I, the nature of perception is examined. A detailed discussion of contemporary versions of naive realism and intentionalist theories is provided, along with their respective counterarguments. Robinson argues that the theory of "sense-data" does not suffer from any of the flaws usually attributed to it but allows us to say that we perceive objects directly as they are expressed physically in beings like ourselves. The theory of "sense-data" can be reconciled with a form of direct realism, provided one correctly understands the cognitive and phenomenal aspects of perception, a relationship that intentionalist theories confuse. As perception makes us aware of objects as they are expressed to us, the question of how they are in themselves remains open. This is the subject of Part II.

A variety of realistic concepts of the material world are explored and found to be either empty or less convincing than idealism: the notion of "forces" in matter, Lewis's quiddities, Esfeld's "points of matter," and quantum theory. Development is also made on the problem of the realistic accountability of space. Regarding mental choices, simple phenomenality and panpsychism are discussed and dismissed. Robinson concludes that Berkeley's theistic phenomenalism or idealism is the most convincing approach.

Pages: 256, Dimensions: 16.2x16.2cm