This study, based on the analysis of a multitude of historical sources, both published and mainly unpublished, as well as oral interviews, is part of the broader research framework concerning the political role and interventionism of the military in Greece during the 20th century. The period 1935-1945 is a turning point, as it is characterized by the annulment of the last elements of irredentist patriotism within the Greek military. The army's defeat in Asia Minor in 1922 transformed irredentism from a war government plan into political self-deception, and the lack of a great patriotic vision led many, especially young officers, to political autonomy, even against the factions that until then controlled the officer corps. This period therefore inaugurates a form of interventionism that saw the military not as an agent in the service of politics, but as an impersonal sovereign and owner of political function for its own account, a tendency that persisted until the imposition of the dictatorship in 1967. The beginning of this change, as well as its first steps, can be placed in the decade 1935-1945, when the officer corps undergoes profound changes and subsequently when the war and the Greek political conflicts of the period overturn past data, allowing the officer corps to reconnect with the throne but also to political radicalization, as well as to the introversion and political complacency of the young royal officers.