This book aims to provide a completely new perspective on the division regarding Greece's entry into World War I. I give it the Greek title The Key, because this is the author's conclusion.

Alexander Montgomery Cunningham, a senior British officer, was sent here in 1915 to assist the British ambassador in bringing Greece into the war. With an independent mind, extensive experience in special diplomatic missions, and friendships at the highest levels of the British Army, Cunningham understands – and presents to us – the failure of negotiations for Greece's participation in the war as a series of blunders by the Allies that are incomprehensible to him.

Why did the Allies subject Greece to "tortures" unnecessarily? And, more specifically, why did they leave the two proposals – with plans from Dousmanis and the approval of King Constantine – unanswered at the end of Spring 1915 for Greece's entry into the war, with all its forces, both army and navy?

However, at that time the Germans had not yet approached their large army on the Danube, and thus there were reasonable hopes that an Anglo-Greek operation in the Balkans would succeed, that the now-isolated Turkey would surrender, that communication with Russia would be restored, that this "back door" of Germany would be breached, and that the war could be won two years earlier.

The book highlights perspectives that have been suppressed and opens up new fields of research.