History is moments. Countries and peoples can be saved or destroyed by a wrong move or by an action that could have been saving but was not taken.

Can a split-second decision overturn a well-established perception? The account of American diplomat James Spein, who served in the Ankara embassy as the second-in-command in the summer of 1974, challenges many of our previous understandings. At the same time, it raises many questions about how he and his superior, Ambassador William V. Macomber Jr., acted on that critical day, July 19th, the day before the Turkish invasion. The two diplomats were tasked with delivering an urgent letter from the U.S. President to Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, but they did not do so. And they did not, even though they went to Ecevit's office. In the letter, Nixon was urging the Turkish Prime Minister, in strong language, not to proceed with his plans for invading Cyprus. Why didn't they do it? What "invisible hand" stopped them?

The book is an updated edition of the Kissinger files, which the authors revealed for the first time over 20 years ago, and re-examines the role of the American Secretary of State in the lead-up to the coup and the Turkish invasion, through new evidence.