The Asia Minor Campaign is undoubtedly the most ambitious undertaking in modern Greek history, an undertaking that collapsed in a resounding failure, territorial dismemberment, a hecatomb of victims, and the uprooting and refugee status of more than 1,000,000 people. Was the failure of the entire endeavor due only to its difficulty, or also to the internal contradictions of a nation divided politically, socially, and geographically? Did these contradictions arise solely from ideological and political reasons, or primarily from the fear of the inhabitants of Old Greece of a possible shift in the center of decision-making to the New Territories? Would a more prudent policy have ensured the unhindered stay of the Asia Minor Greeks in their ancestral homes, or even more so the annexation of Thrace, Eastern and Western?

Far from Manichean approaches about traitors and patriots and conspiracy theories against the nation without brothers, we will examine the main causes that led to the beginning and continuation of the Asia Minor Campaign—and indeed with greater intensity—by its original critics when they came to power, an action that should not be attributed to the usual breaking of pre-election promises. The author also points out a contradiction that he believes prevails in a large part of the academic world: the highly reckless decision (up to 1917) for Greece’s participation in the First World War is praised, while the claim to the region of Smyrna—the only stable compensation offered for this participation—is condemned, while the annexation of Thrace is taken for granted, although it came later chronologically. Finally, he highlights the indirect connection of the Asia Minor Catastrophe with the other two major tragedies of modern Greek history, the Cyprus issue and the Civil War.