The present volume is the second part of a three-volume work that I started writing some time ago to address the unprecedented fiscal and banking crisis that has hit our country and the Eurozone in general over the last six years. The first volume titled The Double Crisis (July 2013) has already been published, while the third and final volume titled Austerity vs Growth in a Monetary Union (July 2015) is being prepared simultaneously.

At the moment when the country is trying to shift from one-sided austerity and stabilization towards healing its wounds and development, the search for solutions and the formulation of realistic proposals within the Eurozone, under the Memorandum (as I have presented in my book The Double Crisis), or beyond the Memorandum (as I present in the current volume) with lower economic costs, and without all those social and political side effects that ultimately harm democracy itself and the European course of the country (rise of extremism, strengthening of Euroscepticism, etc.), is an immediate priority and responsibility for all who are present in public life and dialogue, especially for Professors specializing in this subject.

FOUR are the key questions that this volume aims to provide convincing answers to:

(a) how could and why must Greece stop being under international economic control as soon as possible? In other words, taking advantage of our recent historical re-entry into international capital markets, what are the pillars of a strategy for an early exit from the "state of emergency" and a return to normalcy, within the framework of our European commitments and constraints that arise from the country's participation in the eurozone?

(b) how can the immediate and drastic reduction of tax rates be achieved so that we accomplish an investment shock and thus avoid long-term stagnation in the post-Memorandum era?

(c) what is the appropriate monetary policy that the four major central banks - with an emphasis on the ECB - should follow in this final stage of exiting the global financial crisis?

(d) what are the smart developmental proposals (e.g., binding contracts) aimed at improved fiscal and reform results for the countries of the Eurozone periphery?

The institutional reinforcement of the Union is not enough on its own to regain the trust and support of the Union’s citizens in the common European vision. It is primarily required to demonstrate the effectiveness of its developmental policies through job creation, the improvement of the living standards of European citizens, and the strengthening of social cohesion.