In vain. Can one play with the Constitution and democratic institutions? Can one raise issues such as replacing the procedure for amending the Constitution, as provided in Article 110, with a referendum?

What does the strengthening of the President of the Republic's powers and the direct election by the electorate mean for the parliamentary character of our government? What impact will the potential introduction of a simple proportional electoral system without amending the constitutional provisions that regulate the appointment of the government have on the system, and mainly on governmental stability?

Is the Constitution to blame for the multi-layered crisis the country is experiencing? Can the exit from the crisis be achieved through a constitutional consideration of the Greek issue or are other, much more complex conditions required?

Can a serious and responsible discussion on the amendment of the Constitution take place without the basic prerequisites of political and constitutional consensus? Without historical memory and awareness of the country's institutional accomplishments? While there are unprecedented problems in Justice, independent authorities, and the information landscape?

What are the margins of discretion for the national legislative body in the context of the European crisis and the new correlations arising from the combination of economic crisis, refugee crisis, security crisis, and Brexit?

On these and many other related questions, Nikos Alivizatos, Stavros Tsakyrakis, and Evangelos Venizelos were invited to respond in a public discussion titled "In vain": A discussion about the Constitution and democracy, organized by the Circle of Ideas for National Reconstruction on June 30, 2016, with moderator Ilias Kanellis.