The purpose of this book is to examine the formation of Greek policy regarding Asia Minor from 1914, when the issue arose due to the persecutions against the Greek element by the Young Turk regime, until the military defeat of 1922 and the uprooting of Hellenism after its long-standing presence on the shores of Ionia.

The most appropriate perspective for ascertaining Greek policy is to examine it through the lens of the National Schism, the split that arose as a consequence of World War I. Asia Minor was one of the key elements of the dispute surrounding the advisability of Greece's participation in this war, and on it emerged a fundamental difference in approaches between Venizelos and anti-Venizelism.

Venizelos highlighted Ionia as the axis of the pursuit of the Great Idea, while anti-Venizelism was more cautious, weighing the scale of military involvement as well as the demographic and geomorphological data of Asia Minor. In 1920, anti-Venizelism, despite its reservations, took on the task of continuing Venizelos's policy.

However, it was always evident that the tendency of the Greek political leadership was to shape its stance based more on the presumed strength of the Great Powers, particularly Britain, and less on the actual capabilities of the country. This was the crucial point, and not the return of Constantine, which led to the defeat of the Greeks in Asia Minor.